

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

18 November 1955

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 81-55

SUBJECT: NIE on Soviet Foreign Policy in Light of Foreign Ministers' Conference

The staff proposes that we handle the NIE requested by [ ] 25X1 in support of the NSC 5501 exercise in the following manner:

25X1

1. Timing: [ ] says paper should clear the IAC no later than 13 December and may have to be ready by the 5th. Therefore we would suggest the following deadlines:

Monday, 21 November - Board clears and sends out very brief T/Rs.

Wednesday, 23 November (or Friday, 25th) - Oral contributions

Monday, 28 November - Staff draft to Board

Tuesday, 29 November - Board review

Monday, 5 December (or Friday, 2nd, if deadline is 5th) - IAC Representatives consideration

2. Problem and Scope: To assess, in the light of the Soviet position as revealed at Geneva (and of other Soviet moves, as in ME) whether Soviet policy is different or has shifted from that estimated in NIE 11-13-55. We need not attempt a full-scale redo but, using NIE 11-13 as a base, should outline briefly the extent to which subsequent Soviet behavior has, or has not, altered this estimate. By tying the new paper to NIE 11-13 we can avoid a full scale re-analysis of Soviet motivations, etc. Moreover, since the new estimate

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOCUMENT NO. 34  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S (C)  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1990  
AUTH: HM 70-2  
DATE: 12 MARCH 80 REVIEWER: 018557

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

will almost certainly involve, if anything, only a change in degree not in kind from 11-13, there is no point in a full scale revision.

3. Proposed Terms of Reference are attached.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 11-14-55: REVIEW OF SOVIET  
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF THE GENEVA  
FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

THE PROBLEM

To estimate, in the light of Soviet behavior at Geneva and other recent Soviet moves, particularly in the Middle East, whether there has been a new shift in Soviet foreign policy, and the extent, if any, of this shift.

SCOPE

In view of the fact that NIE 11-13-55 was only recently completed, the most expeditious way to handle the new estimate would be to use NIE 11-13-55 as a point of departure and to examine whether and to what extent our estimate in this NIE has altered as a result of recent Soviet actions. By tying the new estimate to 11-13-55, we can forego a full-scale and time-consuming redo of Soviet motivations, etc., which would be difficult in any case in view of the short deadline we face.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- I. Were there any significant departures from standing Soviet policy on the major issues under discussion at Geneva?
- II. What other recent Soviet actions or attitudes offer clues as to the overall Soviet posture?
- III. In the light of the above, to what extent are the principal judgments in NIE 11-13-55 still valid? For example:
  - a. Are Soviets still seeking an overall reduction in tensions (Paras. 1 and 3 of 11-13-55)?
  - b. If so, does this still appear to be "more than a short-term, tactical" line (Para. 4)?
  - c. Has Soviet policy hardened or stiffened on key East-West issues beyond that outlined in Para. 5?
- IV. Briefly, what specific aims and motivations are behind Soviet tactics:
  - a. At Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference?
  - b. Elsewhere, especially in Middle East?

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~